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Abstract: Recent work on the role of norms in the use of causal language by ordinary people has 
led to a consensus among several researchers: The consensus position is that causal attributions 
are sensitive to both statistical norms and prescriptive norms. But what is a statistical norm? We 
argue that there are at least two types that should be distinguished—agent-level statistical norms 
and population-level statistical norms. We then suggest an alternative account of ordinary causal 
attributions about agents (the responsibility view), noting that this view motivates divergent 
predictions about the effect of information about each of the two types of statistical norms noted. 
Further, these predictions run counter to those made by the consensus position. With this set-up 
in place, we present the results of a series of new experimental studies testing our predictions. 
The results are in line with the responsibility view, while indicating that the consensus position is 
seriously mistaken.  
 
 
 
 
Consider the following scenario based on a thought experiment by Joshua Knobe (2006): 
 Lauren and Jane both work for a company that uses a mainframe that can be accessed 
 from terminals on different floors of its building. The mainframe has recently become 
 unstable, so that if more than one person is logged in at the same time, the system 
 crashes. Therefore, the company has instituted a temporary policy restricting the use of 
 terminals so that two terminals are not used at the same time until the mainframe is 
 repaired. The policy prohibits logging into the mainframe from the terminal on any floor 
 except the ground floor. 
  
 One day, Lauren logged into the mainframe on the authorized terminal on the ground 
 floor at the exact same time that Jane logged into the mainframe on the unauthorized 
 terminal on the second floor. Lauren and Jane were both unaware that the other was 
 logging in. Sure enough, the system crashed. 
 
When this scenario is given to people without training in philosophy, they are significantly more 
likely to say that Jane caused the system to crash than Lauren (Livengood, Sytsma, and Rose, 
                                                 
To appear in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science.  
 
The authors would like to thank Jill Cumby, David Danks, Ben Fraser, Greg Gandenberger, Joshua Knobe, Craig 
Roxborough, an anonymous referee for Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, and the audiences at the 
Causality in the Biomedical and Social Sciences, Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, and Society for 
Philosophy and Psychology conferences for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
 
 
2
2011). And, they do so despite the fact that the actions of both agents were necessary for 
bringing about the outcome: If either Lauren or Jane had not logged-in, the system would not 
have crashed.  
 Results like this have struck many philosophers as quite surprising. They generally take 
the ordinary concept of causation to be purely descriptive in character; and, yet, ordinary causal 
judgments seem to be sensitive to broadly moral considerations. Thus, empirical work by Mark 
Alicke (1992) indicates that ordinary causal attributions are sensitive to whether or not an agent’s 
motives are socially desirable and Knobe (2006) used intuitions about simple cases like that 
discussed above to argue that ordinary causal attributions are sensitive to prescriptive norms (to 
whether a behavior is permissible or impermissible).  
 Not surprisingly, some philosophers have sought to explain such results away, aiming to 
preserve the assumption that the ordinary concept of causation is purely descriptive in character. 
For example, Julia Driver (2008a) suggests that ordinary causal attributions might still be best 
explained in terms of a type of descriptive consideration—statistical norms. Thus, it might be 
that Jane is identified as the cause of the system crashing, in the above example, not because she 
violated a prescriptive norm per se, but because she did something that is statistically atypical in 
doing so—it presumably being unusual to violate company policy. Subsequent empirical work 
has suggested against this, however. In fact, a consensus position has emerged that focuses on 
norms more generally: Ordinary causal attributions are thought to be directly sensitive both to 
behaviors being out of the prescriptive norm (impermissible) and to behaviors being out of the 
statistical norm (atypical). As such, the consensus view takes the effect of prescriptive norms to 
be part of a wider phenomenon, with ordinary causal attributions being sensitive to whether or 
not a behavior is out of the norm, where this includes both purely descriptive and broadly moral 
considerations. 
 
 
3
 We are not convinced by this consensus view, however. Instead, we hold that ordinary 
causal attributions are much more intimately tied to broadly moral considerations than has been 
suggested. Our view is that the ordinary concept of causation, at least as applied to agents, is an 
inherently normative concept: Causal attributions are typically used to indicate something more 
akin to who is responsible for a given outcome than who caused the outcome in the descriptive 
sense of the term used by philosophers. As such, we hold that the current consensus position still 
goes too far in attempting to preserve the purely descriptive conception of causation. We will not 
argue directly for this responsibility view in this paper; rather, we call on it to motivate two 
predictions about the role of statistical norms in folk causal attributions that diverge from those 
given by the consensus view. Focusing on the empirical example that has led to the consensus 
position (Knobe and Fraser’s Pen Case), we present the results of a series of studies testing these 
competing predictions. The results are in line with our predictions and indicate that the 
consensus view is badly mistaken.  
 Here is how we will proceed. In Section 1, we review the debate leading up to the 
consensus position. We then take a closer look at the notion of a statistical norm, distinguishing 
between two types—agent-level and population-level. In Section 3, we briefly describe our 
alternative to the consensus view, and on the basis of it make two competing predictions about 
the role of statistical norms in ordinary causal attributions. These predictions are empirically 
tested in Sections 4 through 6. 
 
1. The Consensus Position 
What types of information do ordinary people call on in making causal attributions about agents? 
Many philosophers have assumed that ordinary causal judgments are by and large based on 
descriptive information. Calling on intuitions about some simple cases, however, Joshua Knobe 
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(2006) has argued that this is incorrect: Ordinary causal attributions are sensitive to prescriptive 
norms. In response, Julia Driver (2008a) has suggested that the role of prescriptive norms can be 
placed within a wider framework when we consider norms more generally. She writes that “we 
might ask whether or not it was that the agent acted wrongly or, rather, somehow ‘out of the 
norm’” (430). 
 Driver’s suggestion can be fleshed out in a couple of different ways. Ordinary causal 
attributions might be directly sensitive to behaviors that are either out of a statistical norm or out 
of a prescriptive norm. Alternatively, ordinary causal attributions might be directly sensitive only 
to behaviors that are out of a statistical norm. Knobe and Fraser (2008) understand Driver to be 
suggesting the second of these two hypotheses, namely “that it might be possible to explain all of 
the puzzling results by appealing to the concept of atypicality” (2008, 442). To test Driver’s 
hypothesis they gave people a story—the Pen Case—describing two characters (Professor Smith 
and an administrative assistant) who behave in ways that are typical of the populations to which 
they belong, but where one of their behaviors is permitted while the other is not.1 Specifically, 
each character takes a pen from the receptionist’s desk and these behaviors jointly lead to a 
problem. Despite both behaviors being statistically typical (being in the statistical norm), Knobe 
and Fraser found that people were far more likely to judge that Professor Smith had caused the 
problem. These results appear to indicate against the hypothesis that ordinary causal attributions 
are only directly sensitive to behaviors being out of a statistical norm, since both characters in 
the Pen Case are described as acting in a way that is statistically typical. 
 Note, however, that Knobe and Fraser’s study does not tell against the disjunctive 
hypothesis noted above: It leaves open the possibility that ordinary causal attributions are 
directly sensitive to behaviors that are either out of a statistical norm or out of a prescriptive 
                                                 
1 Each of the vignettes discussed in this paper, including Knobe and Fraser’s original Pen Case vignette, can be 
found in the appendices to this paper available on the PhilSci Archive. 
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norm. Craig Roxborough and Jill Cumby (2009) conducted a further study to directly test this 
disjunctive hypothesis. They suggest that there are three versions of the Pen Case worth 
considering—Knobe and Fraser’s original version, plus two variations on it. Knobe and Fraser 
tested the version of the Pen Case in which the behaviors of both characters are statistically 
typical of their respective populations, but one might also look at ordinary causal attributions for 
variations where the behavior of only one of the characters is statistically typical and the other is 
statistically atypical. Roxborough and Cumby tested the variation in which Professor Smith’s 
behavior is statistically typical, while the administrative assistant’s behavior is statistically 
atypical. They predicted that participants would be more likely to judge that the administrative 
assistant caused the problem when he acted in a manner that was statistically atypical than when 
he acted in a manner that was statistically typical. What they found, however, is that there was no 
significant difference between the mean response for the question about the administrative 
assistant in their study and the mean response for the same question in Knobe and Fraser’s study. 
Having found no effect where they were looking for one, Roxborough and Cumby went on to 
conduct a post hoc comparison of the mean response for the question about Professor Smith in 
their study and the mean response for the question about Professor Smith in Knobe and Fraser’s 
study. There is a significant difference.2  
 Roxborough and Cumby take these studies to provide evidence that statistical norms 
impact ordinary causal attributions, even if they do not do so in the way originally predicted. As 
such, they advocate the disjunctive hypothesis that ordinary causal attributions are directly 
sensitive to behaviors being out of either a prescriptive norm or a statistical norm. In fact, this 
hypothesis is now the consensus position amongst the primary participants in this debate: Driver 
                                                 
2 To compare the means from Roxborough and Cumby’s study with the means from Knobe and Fraser’s study, the 
appropriate test to use is a Welch, two-sample t-test, which assumes neither equal sample sizes nor equal variances 
for the two means to be compared. For this test, t = -3.3532, df = 27.093, and the p-value = 0.002370. 
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(2008b) endorses it; Roxborough and Cumby (2009) endorse it; and Hitchcock and Knobe 
(2009) endorse it.  
 
2. Atypicality and Statistical Norms 
We have just seen that a consensus position has emerged in the debate about the effect of 
information about norms on ordinary causal attributions: It is held that all else being equal, 
people are more likely to say that an agent who behaves in a way that is out of the norm caused 
an outcome than they are to say that an agent who behaves in a way that is in the norm caused 
the same outcome. With regard to statistical norms specifically, the consensus position holds that 
all else being equal, people are more likely to say that an agent who behaves in a way that is 
statistically atypical caused an outcome than they are to say that an agent who behaves in a way 
that is statistically typical caused the same outcome. 
 What does it mean to say that an agent behaves in a way that is statistically typical or 
atypical? Here are two options. One might say that an agent’s behavior is statistically 
typical/atypical relative to how people generally behave in a given type of situation. Or, one 
might say that an agent’s behavior is statistically typical/atypical relative to how the agent 
herself generally behaves in that type of situation. Call the first kind of statistical norm a 
population-level statistical norm and the second kind an agent-level statistical norm. 
 To illustrate, consider the population consisting of philosophy professors at Fictitious 
State University (FSU). Suppose that 90% of philosophy professors at FSU almost never smoke 
during breaks in their seminars. In contrast, the remaining 10% of professors almost always 
smoke during breaks. Suppose that Professor Madeline Madeup is a smoker and that we observe 
her smoking during a break. Professor Madeup’s smoking is atypical for the population of 
philosophy professors to which she belongs. The philosophy professors at FSU do not typically 
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smoke during breaks. Given that Professor Madeup is a smoker, however, her behavior is typical 
for her.  
 In what follows, we will say that ordinary causal attributions are sensitive to behaviors 
being population-level atypical if, other things being equal, untutored people tend to be more 
likely to say that an agent who behaves in a way that is population-level atypical caused an 
outcome than they are to say that an agent who behaves in a way that is population-level typical 
caused the outcome. We will follow the same convention for sensitivity to behaviors being 
population-level typical, agent-level atypical, agent-level typical, impermissible, or permissible. 
 Having now distinguished between these two types of statistical norms, how should we 
understand the consensus position? When it is claimed that ordinary causal attributions are 
directly sensitive to behaviors being out of either a prescriptive norm or a statistical norm, what 
type of statistical norm is at issue? The answer is not obvious, since the distinction between 
agent-level statistical norms and population-level statistical norms has not been drawn in the 
literature. That this distinction has not been drawn, however, suggests that it is statistical norms 
generally that are at issue, not one or the other type specifically. And there are other reasons to 
think that this is the case. For example, Driver both discusses cases that involve agent-level 
statistical norms (e.g., 2008a, 430), and takes Knobe and Fraser’s Pen Case results to be relevant 
to her account—even though it concerns population-level statistical norms.3 As such, we will 
treat the consensus position as making a claim about statistical norms generally. Nonetheless, it 
is worth noting that there is a problem with the consensus position however we understand 
“statistical norm”—as we will see in the following sections. 
 
                                                 
3 Knobe and Fraser do not describe the behaviors of the characters in the Pen Case as being typical of those agents; 
rather, the vignette only gives information about the typicality of their behaviors relative to the populations to which 
they belong. 
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3. Two Competing Predictions 
We do not believe that the consensus position is correct. Specifically, we are not convinced that 
information about statistical norms directly impacts ordinary causal attributions concerning 
agents. Instead, we conjecture that such attributions primarily reflect people’s broadly moral 
judgments: Causal attributions concerning agents are typically used to express judgments related 
to normative responsibility. Defending this responsibility view is a large project, and we will not 
attempt to establish its correctness in this paper. Rather, we simply note that this view provides 
motivation for two predictions about the role of statistical norms in ordinary causal attributions 
that are directly at odds with the consensus position; we then limit our empirical aims to testing 
these predictions with respect to the example that has driven the debate—Knobe and Fraser’s 
Pen Case. 
 By subsuming the impact of information about statistical and prescriptive norms on 
ordinary causal attributions as different instances of a general phenomenon, the consensus 
position treats the two kinds of norms as having equal standing. Information about both kinds of 
norms is thought to have a direct, independent impact on ordinary causal attributions. The 
responsibility view, by contrast, maintains that in examples like the Pen Case information about 
statistical norms impacts ordinary causal attributions only indirectly: Information about norms 
sometimes plays a role in people’s broadly moral judgments about normative responsibility, 
which are expressed in the causal attributions that they make. And these diverging views lead to 
competing predictions. Specifically, on the basis of the responsibility view we make two 
predictions about the (indirect) role of statistical norms in ordinary causal attributions that diverge 
from the (direct) role specified by the consensus position: First, ordinary causal attributions for 
the Pen Case are insensitive to population-level statistical norms; second, ordinary causal 
attributions for the Pen Case are sensitive to agent-level typicality, not atypicality.  
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 The reasoning behind our first prediction is that we expect that information about 
population-level statistical norms will have little impact on judgments about whether the 
characters are normatively responsible for the problem. More generally, we expect that how 
other people typically act in a given type of situation will largely be treated as irrelevant to 
whether or not a specific person is taken to be normatively responsible for an outcome. Thus, 
while excuses of the form “everybody was doing it” might help to explain an agent’s action, we 
suspect that people generally do not take such excuses to actually mitigate normative 
responsibility. As such, we expect that changing the information given about the population-level 
typicality of a character’s behavior in the Pen Case will not affect how likely people are to say 
that the character caused the problem.  
 The reasoning behind our second prediction is that we expect patterns of behavior to be 
relevant to people’s normative judgments. In cases where the agent could reasonably be expected 
to know that a bad outcome might result from her behavior, we expect that people will be more 
likely to judge that the agent is normatively responsible for the outcome when she typically acts 
in a reckless way. The agent will be judged to be more responsible because her pattern of 
behavior increased the chance that the bad outcome would eventually occur. For example, 
compare the case of a person who habitually jaywalks with that of a person who jaywalks only 
very occasionally. Suppose that each person jaywalks on otherwise identical occasions and that 
each one’s behavior leads to an accident. We (the authors) have the intuition that the habitual 
jaywalker is more blameworthy than the occasional jaywalker because her pattern of behavior 
increased the chance that an accident would eventually occur (in comparison to the occasional 
jaywalker). Expecting that ordinary causal attributions are used for expressing normative 
judgments, we therefore conjecture that with regard to scenarios like the Pen Case people will be 
more likely to say that an agent who behaves in a way that is in the agent-level statistical norm 
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caused a bad outcome than to say that an agent who behaves in a way that is out of the agent-
level statistical norm caused the same bad outcome. 
 If the two predictions made on the basis of the responsibility view are correct, then the 
consensus position is seriously mistaken: (1) ordinary causal attributions are not sensitive to 
information about population-level statistical norms at all, and (2) ordinary causal attributions 
are sensitive to information about agent-level typicality (rather than atypicality). While the 
current empirical evidence for the Pen Case suggests that the first prediction is incorrect, we are 
not convinced that the current empirical data is reliable. We are concerned that the finding that 
ordinary causal attributions are sensitive to information about population-level atypicality 
involves a post hoc comparison of the results from two different studies, with the samples drawn 
from undergraduates in two different countries, and where one of the studies had a relatively 
small number of participants (N=18). As such, we feel that the results of these studies should not 
be accepted until they have been replicated. Moreover, the role of information about agent-level 
statistical norms on ordinary causal attributions has not been tested at all. 
 
4. New Studies on Population-Level Statistical Norms 
In this section, we present two studies that we conducted to test the effect of information about 
population-level statistical norms on ordinary causal attributions about the Pen Case. The first 
study includes permissibility information, while the second does not. 
 
4.1 Study 1: The Pen Case Revisited 
We began by collecting responses to the three versions of the Pen Case noted in Section 1.4  
                                                 
4 The vignettes used for each of the studies described in this paper can be found in the appendices available on the 
PhilSci Archive. In addition, for ease of readability, further details about the samples for these studies, as well as the 
statistical analyses performed, are included in those appendices.  
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This includes the two versions compared by Roxborough and Cumby (2009), as well as the case 
in which the administrative assistant’s behavior is population-level typical, while the professor’s 
behavior is population-level atypical. In each version, both the administrative assistant and 
Professor Smith take pens; further, in each version it is permissible for the administrative 
assistant to do so, while it is impermissible for Professor Smith to do so.  
 Responses for these three probes were collected online from 151 native English speakers, 
18 years of age or older, with at most minimal training in philosophy. Each participant was 
randomly assigned to one of the three versions of the Pen Case described above. After reading 
the vignette, participants were asked to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with each of 
two causal claims—“Professor Smith caused the problem” and “the Administrative Assistant 
caused the problem”—on a 7-point scale anchored at 1 with “strongly disagree,” at 4 with 
“neutral,” and at 7 with “strongly agree.” The results are shown in Figure 1.  
 What we found is that information about population-level statistical norms had no 
significant impact on judgments about who caused the problem. Thus, contrary to the consensus 
position (but in line with our first prediction from Section 3), participants’ responses were not 
sensitive to behaviors being population-level atypical. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Results for Study 1. 
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4.2 Study 2: The Pen Case without Permissibility Information 
Permissibility information was included in each of the versions of the Pen Case that we ran in 
Study 1 (as well as in the studies conducted by Knobe and Fraser and by Roxborough and Cumby). 
Thus, population-level statistical norms might still play a role in ordinary causal attributions about 
the Pen Case: Perhaps the information about prescriptive norms overrides the information about 
population-level statistical norms. To test this we ran a second study, removing the information 
about prescriptive norms from the Pen Case vignettes used in our first study. In addition, we 
included a fourth variation in which both characters act atypically. Responses for these four 
vignettes were collected online from 183 native English speakers, 18 years of age or older, with at 
most minimal training in philosophy. The results are shown in Figure 2.  
 Once again we found that population-level statistical norms have no discernable effect on 
ordinary causal attributions for the Pen Case. Thus, in the absence of permissibility information, 
there was no significant difference between the mean responses for the two statements in any of 
the conditions. In fact, if we average the responses for each of the questions in which the 
character behaved population-level typically, we find that it is virtually identical to the average 
for the responses for the questions in which the character behaved population-level atypically.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Study 2 results. 
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5. Studies on the Effect of Agent-Level Statistical Norms 
 
In line with the first prediction we made in Section 3, and against the consensus view, the two 
studies described in the previous section undermine the claim that population-level atypical 
behaviors are more likely to be judged causes than are population-level typical behaviors.  
 Recall, however, that we made two predictions: Not only did we predict that ordinary 
causal attributions for the Pen Case are insensitive to population-level statistical norms, we also 
predicted that ordinary causal attributions would be sensitive to agent-level statistical norms for 
examples like the Pen Case. Specifically, we conjectured that people would be more likely to say 
that a character who behaved agent-level typically was the cause of a bad outcome than a 
character who behaved agent-level atypically. To test this predication, we ran a series of further 
studies in which we rewrote the Pen Case to change the population-level statistical norms to 
agent-level statistical norms.  
 
5.1 Study 3: The Agent-Level Pen Case 
In our third study we gave participants four further variations on the Pen Case in which we 
varied the agent-level typicality of the behaviors while specifying that the administrative 
assistant (now given the name John) acts permissibly and Professor Smith acts impermissibly. 
Responses for these four vignettes were collected online from 216 native English speakers, 18 
years of age or older, with at most minimal training in philosophy. The results are shown in 
Figure 3.  
 We found that, in contrast with our results in Study 1, assignment to a specific vignette 
affected participant responses. In fact, we found that when information about permissibility and 
agent-level typicality push in different directions, agent-level typicality information wins out. 
For example, looking specifically at the case in which Professor Smith acts both agent-level 
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atypically and impermissibly, while John acts agent-level typically and permissibly, the mean 
response for the former is actually significantly lower than the mean response for the latter. 
Thus, we find that in line with our second prediction, and counter to the consensuses position, 
people are more likely to say that a character caused the problem when he behaves agent-level 
typically than when he behaves agent-level atypically. It appears that ordinary causal attributions 
are not sensitive to behaviors being out of the statistical norm for cases like this, but are in fact 
sensitive to behaviors being in the statistical norm. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Study 3 results. 
 
 
5.2 Study 4: The Agent-Level Pen Case without Permissibility Information 
To further test the impact of information about agent-level statistical norms on ordinary causal 
attributions, in our fourth study we removed the permissibility information from the versions of 
the Pen Case used in Study 3. Responses for these four vignettes were collected online from 167 
native English speakers, 18 years of age or older, with at most minimal training in philosophy. 
The results are shown in Figure 4.  
 What we find is that when agent-level statistical norms are used instead of population-
level statistical norms, assignment to a specific vignette affects participant responses even when 
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no permissibility information is included. Specifically, participants were more likely to say that a 
character caused the problem when he behaved agent-level typically than when he behaved 
agent-level atypically. These results provide further support for the claim that ordinary causal 
attributions are sensitive to agent-level typicality (not atypicality), at least for examples like the 
Pen Case. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Study 4 results. 
 
 
 
6. Problems with the Pen Case 
The studies reported in the previous two sections are in line with the predictions we made in 
Section 3 and provide evidence against the consensus position detailed in Section 1. Further, 
these four studies investigated the empirical example that has driven the consensus position—
Knobe and Fraser’s Pen Case. Despite this, it might nonetheless be argued that the Pen Case is a 
bad example. Thus, it could be objected that there are problems with the vignettes used that 
undermine the conclusions drawn about the impact of statistical norms on ordinary causal 
attributions. Given that the empirical evidence for the consensus position comes from studies 
using the Pen Case, however, this objection applies to that position as much as it applies to the 
alternative that we have proposed.  
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 Be that as it may, the objection that the Pen Case is a bad example also applies to the 
positive conclusions we drew in Sections 4 and 5. As such, in this section we discuss the most 
serious problem for the vignettes tested. We then respond to the objection by presenting the 
results of two final studies. What we find is that even after rewriting the vignettes to remove the 
problem, our predictions are still supported. 
The most serious problem with the Pen Case is that there is a non-trivial time delay 
between the agents taking pens and the problem occurring. Thus, the administrative assistant and 
Professor Smith take pens in the morning, while the problem occurs later that day. As such, a 
participant might reasonably infer that other people would have taken pens in the meantime and 
this could plausibly mitigate their causal judgments about the example. Further, with regard to 
the Pen Case vignettes used in Studies 3 and 4, in particular, it might be argued that this problem 
is exacerbated by our having been heavy-handed in describing the agents’ patterns of behavior: 
In the version in which both agents act typically, for example, they are described as each taking a 
pen almost every time they pass the receptionist’s desk. Thus, participants might infer that they 
each took multiple pens between Monday morning and the time the problem occurred. 
 
6.1 Study 5: The Modified Agent-Level Pen Case 
To test the objection, we rewrote the vignettes to further flesh-out the example and to remove the 
problem concerning the time delay noted above. As with the previous studies, the text of the 
rewritten vignettes is included in the online appendices. We began by testing the impact of agent-
level statistical norms. In Study 5, participants were given rewritten versions of the vignettes 
used in Study 3. Responses for these four vignettes were collected online from 198 native 
English speakers, 18 years of age or older, with at most minimal training in philosophy. The 
results are shown in Figure 5.  
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 What we find is that even after rewriting the vignettes, assignment to a specific probe still 
affected participant responses. Specifically, participants remained more likely to say that a 
character caused the problem when he behaved agent-level typically than when he behaved 
agent-level atypically. These results provide further support for the claim that ordinary causal 
attributions about agents are sensitive to agent-level typicality (not atypicality); further, they 
undermine the claim that our results can be explained away by calling on the problem with the 
Pen Case noted above. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Study 5 results. 
 
 
 
6.2 Study 6: Modified Population-Level and Agent-Level Pen Case 
In our final study, we randomly gave participants one of 16 variations on the rewritten versions 
of Pen Case used in the previous study. Each of these vignettes included information about both 
population-level statistical norms and agent-level statistical norms for each of the two characters 
(giving 16 combinations total for these four variables). Responses were collected online from 
760 native English speakers, 18 years of age or older, with at most minimal training in 
philosophy. 
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 As predicted, we found that agent-level statistical norms, but not population-level 
statistical norms, mattered for ordinary causal attributions. Specifically, participants were more 
likely to say that a character caused the problem when he behaved agent-level typically than 
when he behaved agent-level atypically, and participants were neither more nor less likely to say 
that a character caused the problem when he behaved population-level typically than when he 
behaved population-level atypically. These results once again support each of our two 
predictions, while indicating that the consensus position is seriously mistaken. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have reconsidered the recent debate concerning the role of statistical norms in 
ordinary causal attributions. Participants in this debate have sought to explain the seemingly 
surprising finding that ordinary causal attributions are not just sensitive to purely descriptive 
considerations, but are also sensitive to broadly moral considerations: The consensus position 
that has emerged assimilates broadly moral considerations about the permissibility of behaviors 
to a wider phenomenon that includes purely descriptive considerations about the typicality of 
behaviors. This position holds that people are more likely to say that an agent caused an outcome 
when she acts in a way that is out of the norm than when she acts in a way that is in the norm, 
where these norms may be either prescriptive norms or statistical norms. Hence, according to the 
consensus position, both prescriptive norms and statistical norms directly and independently 
affect ordinary causal attributions.  
By contrast, we conjectured that ordinary causal attributions concerning agents are 
related to attributions of normative responsibility. As such, we suggested that statistical norms 
might affect ordinary causal attributions only indirectly by affecting judgments about normative 
responsibility. On the basis of this suggestion we made two predictions concerning the role of 
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information about statistical norms in folk causal attributions for variants on Knobe and Fraser’s 
Pen Case: (1) Ordinary causal attributions are insensitive to population-level statistical norms; 
(2) ordinary causal attributions are sensitive to agent-level typicality, not atypicality. Both of 
these predictions diverge from those suggested by the consensus position. We then ran a series of 
studies to test these predictions: Our predictions, but not those given by the consensus position, 
were consistent with the experimental results. 
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